Category: Companies

  • Reading the tea leaves; Unilever looks to move Lipton

    Reading the tea leaves; Unilever looks to move Lipton

    Unilever, the world’s largest tea producer, is looking to get out of the tea business.

    From Reuters:

    The company said the review was triggered by the sales slowdown of traditional black tea in developed markets as consumers shift towards herbal tea. Black tea is the dominant part of Unilever’s tea business, Pitkethly said, selling in 60 countries and generating 3 billion euros ($3.3 billion) in annual sales.

    After air and water, tea is the most consumed substance on earth, but that doesn’t mean it’s a good business to be in—specifically the type of tea it sells through its Lipton brand. Black tea is a commodity, one that less and less people are drinking. Instead, consumers are gravitating towards higher-end drinks.

    The Financial Times explains:

    Unilever has been particularly hurt by a shift to more upmarket brands. While retail sales volumes of black tea dropped in the five years to 2019 — by 15.3 per cent to 71,400 tonnes in the UK — the value sold rose over the same period, as many buyers traded up to premium versions. That left established mid-market brands struggling.

    A divestment makes sense. CPG companies like Unilever excel at building value added brands. Unilever is focused on building brands centered around purpose. What purpose does a commodity drink, like black tea, serve? None, really.

    What will happen to Unilever’s tea business?

    In 2017, Unilever faced a similar dilemma with its Spreads division, where it owned brands “Country Crock” and “I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter.” Sales of both brands were effectively flat for a decade. Like what is happening to gum, consumers overwhelmingly stopped buying artificial spreads. They switched to butter (Irish butter specifically) and other natural options. Stuck with declining brands in a shrinking category, Unilever sold the spreads division to KKR & Co (of Barbarians at the Gate fame) for $8 billion.

    The facts work against Unilever. Despite owning a few powerhouse brands, the lack of overall category revenue growth means that it’s incredibly unlikely that a consumer goods company would even consider purchasing the unit. That means the likely outcome here is similar to spreads—private equity.

    Private Equity has different priorities than a consumer goods company. A consumer goods company is looking to build sustained revenue growth. They’re in the business for the long haul. A private equity company is looking for cash flow.

    Here’s how KKR & Co overall strategy was described in Barbarians at the Gate:

    During this period the trio fine-tuned its craft. They found larger companies could be acquired as easily as small ones, for the simple reason that they had larger cash flows; by diverting that money to pay down its debt, Kohlberg Kravis was able to use a company’s own strengths to acquire it. They began accumulating pools of money from investors, allowing them fast access to larger amounts of cash. Beginning with a $30 million fund in 1978, they raised a series of steadily larger pools, eventually reaching $1 billion in their fourth fund in 1983. The size of the deals grew in lockstep, reaching a peak during this period with the $440 million buyout of a Hawaiian construction company, Dillingham Corp.

    In short, a private equity firm will streamline operations and then use the cash flow to pay down the debt associated with the acquisition, and then finance more and more deals.

    Tea may be in decline, but it certainly generates stable and reliable cash flow for this purpose. In 2018 it generated about $3 billion in sales, or about 14% of Unilever’s food and refreshment revenue.

    Photo by Manki Kim on Unsplash

  • Revenue Growth Management: Coca-Cola profit rises investment pays off

    Revenue Growth Management: Coca-Cola profit rises investment pays off

    Coke announced it achieved or exceeded revenue and profits expectations for 2019. This came in stark contrast to 2017 when it looked like the Atlanta based fast-moving consumer product company faced an existential crisis over sugar. Consumers didn’t want to drink it anymore—bad news for a company whose portfolio revolved around sugary drinks. In two years, the company repositioned itself around sugar-free sodas and other healthier alternatives. It included the acquisition of Fair Life, a brand in the struggling dairy market, that was successfully integrated into the company’s distribution network. The result, according to CEO James Quincy, was growth “in a more sustainable way.” Despite the prevailing narrative, I don’t think it was just a transition to healthier products that drove results. It was also a successful execution of revenue growth management.

    What is Revenue Growth Management?

    The consumer goods value chain is broken down into three parts:

    1. Manufacturers
    2. Customers (Retailers)
    3. Consumers.

    Successful companies look to maximize their bargaining position between each part in the chain. The ideal position is a monopoly, but If that’s not possible, managers look to streamline and optimize each connecting point. The connecting point between Manufacturers and Retailers is called trade spend. Trade spend is a mixture of manufacturer to retailer pricing discounts and slotting payments to maximize the manufacturers position between Retailers and Consumers. It drives in-store pricing, shelf placement, and promotional activity (think buy-one-get one.) Revenue Growth Management is about optimizing trade spend between 1 and 2, to grow demand at 3.

    Here’s how Coca-Cola COO Brian Smith described Coke’s approach in 2019.

    It’s the ability to look at the total market, all of the offerings that are there, both ours and our competitors, and look at what consumers want, and to be able to then –with a lot of information, a lot of data, be able to figure out where the big opportunity areas are for us…

    Now, that’s a lot of information and it can be super complicated. And so, once you have that, you need to figure out within that how to sequence the things that you’re going to go after, based on what your system capability is, because you can’t necessarily do everything at once, but if you do that in an organized, disciplined fashion, then you begin to grab those opportunities and to drive your revenues and your profits.

    Basically, it’s the ability to analyze consumer consumption data against retailer activity to identify better opportunities for trade spend to “grab those opportunities and to drive your revenues and your profits.” It may sound simple, but it is incredibly complex. Coca-Cola sells to hundreds of thousands of retailers across the globe—each with a different product assortment and level of data sophistication. Coke must not only identify the opportunities but create the right mechanisms to ensure the company actually executes them with the retailer.

    In the most recent earnings call, Coke CEO James Quincey made it clear that Coke has laid a revenue growth management foundation. In fact, he gave a concrete example of it.

    Working with one of our European bottling partners, we added an incremental 100,000 transactions per week for one of our largest customers through insights driven by our RGM capabilities. This kind of collaboration helps drive results, leveraging the power of our consumer insights to support growth for us, our bottling partners, and our customers. It’s another example of how we create shared value for all who touch the Coca-Cola business. And we’re still in the early stages of building out these capabilities and see this as a source of growth for a long time to come.

    What’s really interesting, and exciting for Coca-Cola shareholders, is that there is a lot of low-hanging fruit here. The connecting point between manufacturers and retailers has long been relatively opaque. Trade spend has traditionally been viewed as a simple cost of doing business—not an opportunity to optimize a manufacturers return. With the advent of big data and cloud-based computing, it’s never been more affordable or practical for CPG manufacturers to maximize their trade spend through revenue growth management.

    Photo by Maximilian Bruck on Unsplash

  • Why did Dean Foods go Bankrupt? A Porter Model Analysis reveals the truth.

    Why did Dean Foods go Bankrupt? A Porter Model Analysis reveals the truth.

    In November 2019, during an economic expansion, Dean Foods declared bankruptcy. The nation’s largest dairy company, with the number one white and chocolate milk brand, could not make money. In January 2020, Borden Dairy followed suit. Most post-mortems dealt with the fact that both companies produced dairy — a product that fewer and fewer people consume. This is true. According to the USDA, from 2000 to 2017, per capita milk consumption in America declined 24 percent. Very few companies can survive a massive decline in their keystone product. But it’s not the full story.

    To understand how two of America’s largest dairy companies found themselves with hundreds of million in debt and few good options, you need to understand the competitive forces that drove the evolution of the dairy industry.

    The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy

    The most common way to analyze industrial competition was first popularized in Michael Porter’s classic 1979 paper “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy.” According to Harvard Business School, Porter’s article has been cited over 6,000 times, making it arguably the most influential management paper of all time. The general crux of Porter’s argument is that five disparate forces drive competition within any industry. The forces continuously change based on advances in technology and policy. It is a manager’s job to position the company to compete where they are the weakest.

    In his 2008 update, Porter explained how the five forces drive profitability in the airline sector.

    1. Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: How incumbents compete. For the vast majority of consumers, airlines aggressively compete on price.
    2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers: There are only a few plane and engine manufacturers — giving each one additional leverage over airlines.
    3. Threat of New Entrants: It’s a high-profile industry that new flight providers continuously enter. Some succeed (JetBlue) and some fail (Virgin and Hooters)
    4. Threat of Substitute Products or Services: Train and car travel are always options
    5. Bargaining Power of Buyers: Limited customer loyalty (except business travelers).

    I would add a sixth driver to the list: political economy. Essentially, political economy is how the government decides to organize the economy. If you analyze the dairy industry from this modified Porter’s model, it becomes evident that changing customer tastes were not the primary cause of Deans or Bordens’ problems. Rather, the companies are caught in a vice from all sides, driven by longstanding government policy. The bankruptcies are a warning for all CPG manufacturers. To see why, you need to understand how political economy shaped the retail industry.

    A Brief History of Dairy Processing (1900–1950)

    Before the 1950s, dairy was an intensely local industry. That’s because dairy is a unique industry from an operational point of view. Raw milk supply is effectively constant. Unlike fruits or vegetables that have defined growing and harvesting seasons, cows must be milked every day. Once the raw milk is out in the world, it must be processed immediately, or it goes bad. Once it’s processed, milk must be delivered to consumers quickly for the same reason. The entire system operated under the threat of a couple week countdown. This led to an industry framework where dairy processors congregated outside of major metropolitan areas. Rural farmers provided raw milk to processors, who expanded the shelf-life via processing and distributed it to urban consumers.

    During this era, farmers (suppliers) had limited bargaining power with processors. Unlike farmers, dairy processors were well-capitalized, few in numbers, and could easily drive raw milk prices down by playing small farmers against each other. After years of predatory behavior by processors, the Federal government regulated the industry by prioritizing a co-op model. Essentially, farmers were encouraged to join together to negotiate better prices with dairy processors.

    A recent USDA report explains today’s processing market:

    Firms that produce fluid milk and dairy products are either dairy cooperatives or proprietary companies. Many of the proprietaries are large companies in themselves or are subsidiaries of some larger company. Dairy cooperatives are businesses owned by the farmers who supply them with milk. Farmer cooperatives range from very small, either by volume or membership criteria, to very large. Proprietary companies have gravitated toward the fluid milk and ice cream businesses, cooperatives have dominated butter manufacturing, and both have been important to cheese.

    Today, co-ops handle about 85% of consumer milk.

    From 1900–1950, a Porter’s model of the dairy industry would look something like this.

    • Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: Competed mostly on price and distribution networks. Distribution through a costly direct-to-consumer “milk-man” system.
    • Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Primarily small farmers with no individual bargaining power. Government intervention led to co-ops and greater equality between processors and suppliers.
    • Threat of New Entrants: Milk processing was a capital-intensive industry with high production and distribution costs. A perishability moat protected incumbents from geographic expansion. The primary threat was dairy co-ops transitioning from selling groups to processors.
    • Threat of Substitute Products or Services: Limited. Milk was a consumer staple.
    • Bargaining Power of Buyers: Buyers were primarily individual consumers. Limited leverage due to perishability, transportation issues, and small purchase size. A single consumer could not really play processors off each other.
    • Political Economy: Geared towards regulated competition. The government enforced anti-trust laws to ensure that dairy processors, farmers, and retailers shared an equitable balance of power.

    The model held until technological innovation drastically altered the playing field.

    Technical Disruption (1950s — 1980s)

    The dominance of local dairy processors unraveled in the 1950s. Driven primarily by technology, the industry progressed from a local industry to a regional industry and then finally national.

    The Congressional Research Service explains:

    However, throughout the second half the of 20th century, several factors combined to reduce the cost of moving milk from producers to consumers and ensuring a transition to what is now a national milk and dairy product market. These factors included improved roadways (e.g., the interstate highway system) and larger and faster trucks for bulk transport of milk (tanker trucks). By the 1970s, most retail milk was purchased in stores (or through food service), primarily in lightweight plastic or paper containers.

    Essentially, technology destroyed the perishability moat that protected small local dairy processors. There was now a massive incentive for processors to expand into new geographies — and building a regional brand was the best way to do so.

    At the same time, local grocery stores evolved into regional chains. Now with regional scale, retailers looked to expand to new geographies and viewed low-cost private label milk as a key traffic driver.

    Again, Structural Change in the US Dairy Industry:

    In the 1960’s, most large supermarket chains installed central milk programs. Some built their own plants, especially to capture guaranteed margins in those States where wholesale and retail prices of milk were set by a State agency. The others contracted with one milk company for private label milk at significantly lower prices made possible both by larger volume (one processor instead of three or four) and limited service (delivery to the retailer’s platform instead of arranging individual cartons in the case).

    The following competitive framework developed

    1. Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: Milk processors competed on price and distribution network via a direct-store-delivery network. Regional and private-label milk brands were now common.
    2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Advancements in road and refrigeration technologies allowed farmer co-ops to expand their shipment radius and increase their bargaining power. A farm in Iowa could now easily sell to a dairy processor in Wisconsin.
    3. Threat of New Entrants: Advancements in road and refrigeration technologies allowed local processors to expand into new geographies. The perishability moat was removed. There was still a significant capital cost for net-new entrants (distribution, production.) Large retail chains enter the market through private label.
    4. Threat of Substitute Products or Services: Limited. Milk was a consumer staple.
    5. Bargaining Power of Buyers: Primary buyers are now grocery and retail customers — not individual consumers. Most grocery chains are still local — ensuring leverage for processors. But retail chains have more leverage than individual consumers — enabling volume discounts.
    6. Political Economy: Still geared towards regulated competition.

    CPG manufacturers, like dairy processors, excelled in the post-world era of regulated competition. In the 1980s, the political economy changed. Slowly, but surely, the groundwork was being laid for their demise.

    Consolidation lays the groundwork for Bankruptcy at Dean Foods (1980s — on)

    As I’ve explained, the dairy industry was originally structured around a balance of power between suppliers, processors, and retailers. If a proposed acquisition was deemed to give too much power to one party, it was rejected. This framework was true for every CPG company. Starting around the 1980s, the political economy of America became focused on one thing: lowering prices for consumers.

    It may seem like a small thing, but in reality, it drastically changed the power dynamic for every CPG firm. In the 1960s, the US government blocked a grocery store merger because it would control seven percent of the Los Angeles Market. Today, Walmart controls fifty percent of the grocery market in 43 metro areas. This hands-off approach shifted the balance of power to retailers and large manufacturers. Consolidation was now the principal growth strategy for almost every actor. The bigger a company was, the more it can dominate negotiations.

    The LA Times describes how retailers reacted:

    Last year, Kroger Co. announced plans to buy Ralphs Grocery Co. from parent Fred Meyer Inc. and Albertson’s said it would buy American Stores Co., which owns Lucky. A year earlier, Safeway Inc. took over Vons Cos. before later moving into Chicago to buy Dominick’s Supermarkets Inc. Roughly 10% of the supermarkets in the United States have merged just in the last six months.

    Dean Foods did not stand idle. It kicked off the 1990s with a torrent of acquisitions. From 1989–1992 it added $300 million in revenue by acquiring food processors in California, Tennessee and Washington. The strategy was simple. It purchased an established regional brand, modernized the processing plant with cutting edge technology, and folded the operations into the company’s existing infrastructure. The result was more leverage against suppliers, retailers, and the ability to expand into new geographies. The company repeated that strategy throughout the decade.

    Dean wasn’t the only processor following this strategy. Four-firm concentration is a common metric used to measure an industry’s concentration. In 1972, when the political economy was built around regulated competition it was at 17%. By 2002, under a new regime, the top four dairy processors controlled almost 43% of the nation’s dairy market. Deans closest rival, Suiza, entered the market in the early 1990s. In just eight short years the Dallas based company engineered 43 separate acquisitions. By 2000, Suiza, a dairy processor that did not exist in 1980, was the largest dairy processor in the nation.

    That same year, Suiza purchased Dean Foods for $1.6 billion.

    In the end, the new Dean Foods / Suiza divested 11 plants, won regulatory approval and the new Dean Foods became the largest dairy processor in American history. It’s inconceivable that the two companies would even consider the merger just twenty years before.

    The power of buyers increased exponentially, and dairy processors reacted. The result was a new competitive framework.

    1. Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: Milk is still a commodity, but with some innovation — Dean introduced new bottle types. Overall, pricing drives competition. Private label drives prices down. Dairy processors look to get bigger in order to assert leverage.
    2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Decreased substantially. Consolidation means fewer processors and less leverage. Family farms enter a crisis.
    3. Threat of New Entrants: Large. Suiza did not exist in 1980. By 2000 it owned Dean Foods.
    4. Threat of Substitute Products or Services: Limited. Milk was a consumer staple.
    5. Bargaining Power of Buyers: Immense. Consolidation enabled retailers to demand, and receive, massive price discounts.
    6. Political Economy: Regulated competition is no longer a priority. Lowering consumer prices drive policy.

    You’d be hard pressed to say that consolidation outright caused the Dean Foods’ or Borden bankruptcy. The Dean / Suiza merger was profitable for a decade. However, it pushed the company to acquire a large and expensive fixed cost production footprint across the nation.

    It seemed like a safe bet. Milk was a consumer staple for 80 years. 

    Then that changed.

    Changing consumer tastes

    We’re about 2,500 words into this post. Now is a good time to bring up changing consumer tastes. In the last decade, people quit drinking milk.

    CNBC has some relevant data points:

    • U.S. milk consumption has been falling for decades. In 1984, milk consumption represented a 15% share of all eating occasions, according to the NPD Group. By 2019, milk represents only a 9% share.
    • In the last four years, sales of non-dairy milks have risen 23%, according to Nielsen data. Alternatives like soy and almond milk have become popular as health-conscious consumers have grown wary of dairy.

    Putting this all into context, to defend itself against predatory retailers, dairy processors took on an incredible amount of debt to acquire a massive milk production infrastructure. Then people quit drinking milk.

    The bottom drops out

    Retailers view milk as a traffic driver. They want it as cheap as possible in order to drive store traffic. This isn’t a new development. Dean Foods’ revenue is split 50:50 between private label and branded. It makes sense for Dean and other dairy processors to produce both because it controls a massive production infrastructure. Now, what happens when profits driven by retail consolidation allows a major customer to capture more value by producing its own commodity? In 2017, Walmart built its own milk processing plant in Indiana.

    The result was a loss was an immediate 2.2% loss in net sales for Dean.

    By 2017, Dean Foods owned a sprawling and expensive production footprint for a commodity CPG. People no longer demanded the product. Its customers then decided it was more cost-effective for them to produce it. A Dean Foods’ bankruptcy went from a possibility to almost a guarantee.

    The Competitive Framework of the Dean Foods Bankruptcy

    If you look at the milk industry from a modified Porter’s model, it’s clear the company had nowhere to go but down.

    1. Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: Brands exists, but competition is primarily based on price — which is continually pushed down by private label.
    2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Limited. Approximately two dairy farms go bankrupt in Wisconsin every day.
    3. Threat of New Entrants: Intense. Milk is increasingly viewed as a traffic driver for groceries. Larger chains like Walmart are building their own processing plants in order to offer lower prices that drive traffic.
    4. Threat of Substitute Products or Services: High. Health concerns and changing consumer tastes have increased the demand for milk alternatives.
    5. Bargaining Power of Buyers: Immense. Retailer consolidation is at an all-time high leading to take-it-or-leave-it negotiations.
    6. Political Economy: Regulated competition is no longer a priority. Policy is driven by consumer price — not competition.

    It’s easy to point to changing consumer preferences as the cause of Dean Foods’ bankruptcy. After all, people are drinking less milk.

    But it isn’t that simple.

    By 2019, dairy processors faced incredible pressure from nearly every aspect of Porter’s model. This pressure was evolutionary; driven by a changing political economy, technology, and changing consumer taste. And remember—the same forces that caused Dean Foods’ bankruptcy apply towards every CPG manufacturer in America.

    Photo by Jagoda Kondratiuk on Unsplash

  • P&G to buy Billie. It may work, but not for the reason you think

    P&G to buy Billie. It may work, but not for the reason you think

    In early January, P&G announced plans to buy Billie, a subscription-based, direct-to-consumer brand focused on women razors. Female razors have long been a consistent revenue generator for CPG companies—not due to product quality—but because of a strange mix of sexism, product development and market concentration. The US female razor market is a $1 billion industry dominated by three firms: P&G, Bic, and Edgewell (Schick.) Historically, female razors grew out existing male technology—an already expensive product. These two points allowed manufacturers to charge a “pink tax” on female products. On average, despite being similar technology, female razors are seven percent more expensive than male.

    Billie positioned itself to address each one of these market inefficiencies head on. In 2017 the company launched itself as a direct-to-consumer brand, centered around authentic engagement, and confronting the sexist pink tax. The result was a viral marketing campaign reminiscent of Dollar Shave Club, and a lot of positive coverage for ‘disrupting’ an industry through a direct-to-consumer strategy. Three years later P&G acquired the company for an undisclosed sum.

    This week’s investor call was the first time P&G talked in any detail about the acquisition.

    CFO and COO Jon Moeller explains:

    We’re pretty excited about the Billie acquisition. That’s something that obviously needs to pass regulatory clearance and we need to remain separate from that business until that happens. But there is a real unique set of skills, experiences and knowledge between Billie and P&G that we think has the potential to create some real magic.

    Clearly they’ve created very effectively a fresh new brand that extends across several categories and they’ve done it and we can benefit from their experience on this in a digital fashion with one-to-one mass marketing, which is something we’re continuing to increase our focus and keep focus on and capabilities related to.

    We have innovation capability across the majority of their categories. We have best-in-class manufacturing across the majority of their categories, and we have a go-to-market presence both online and bricks-and-mortar certainly in omnichannel that can accelerate the growth in that business. So we’re very excited about the potential and are working through the clearance process.

    You’ll notice that there isn’t much here about Billie’s direct-to-consumer capabilities, a major talking point of early coverage and the whole reason Unilever acquired Dollar Shave Club. Instead, Moeller describes the benefits of plugging Billie into P&G’s established manufacturing and sales organization. In fact, the only reference to online distribution is about P&G’s own established abilities (The company’s Venus brand has a D2C service.) Apart from individualized marketing, he talks about it as he would any other brand acquisition.

    That’s because this is just a normal acquisition. Despite the large amount of attention paid to the business model, a direct-to-consumer strategy for consumables isn’t profitable.

    Here’s the WSJ revisiting Unilever’s high profile acquisition of Dollar Shave Club:

    The venture proved more challenging than Unilever had anticipated. Executives discovered the average expense of winning each new customer was about the same online as in stores, one of the people familiar with the matter said. And Unilever realized the business would be faring even worse if not for an unusual quirk: Many men were neglecting to cancel their subscriptions even after they quit using the blades.

    Dollar Shave Club is expected to break even next year, the person said, but Unilever has concluded that selling staples as online subscriptions doesn’t make financial sense. The company still values the data gathered from the direct-to-consumer brand.

    Executives know this. With P&G to buy Billie, the plan isn’t to build an online direct-to-consumer giant, it’s to add a young digital native brand to its traditional brick-and-mortar line-up.

    Image via Flickr

  • CPG Innovation: Why New Benefits Aren’t Going to Save Gum

    CPG Innovation: Why New Benefits Aren’t Going to Save Gum

    Innovation is a somewhat nebulous concept in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. Every company will claim innovation is a priority, but very few are good at it. In fact, I would say that most CPG companies are terrible at it.

    From the WSJ

    Gum makers are mixing everything from vitamins to candy into their recipes to give customers more incentives to pick up a pack.

    Chewing gum has lost sales to mints, and customers have gravitated to other means of burning nervous energy, like fidget spinners and smartphones, executives, and market-research firms say. Some people say they dropped gum-chewing because it seems tacky or causes jaw pain. Gum sales dropped 4% globally by volume between 2010 and 2018, according to Euromonitor, and 23% in the U.S.

    “Chewing gum is becoming less socially acceptable,” said Dirk Van de Put, chief executive of Mondelez International Inc., owner of Trident and Dentyne, in a recent interview.

    Trying to turn things around, Mondelez and other gum makers are coming up with formulas that they say convey additional benefits. Trouble sleeping? There is a gum for that. Other new chewing gums purport to boost energy, alleviate headaches and stimulate weight loss.

    To summarize:

    1. The gum category is declining

    2. The blame falls on changing consumer taste and fidget spinners

    3. CPG companies are responding via “innovation.”

    I find it hilarious that gum manufacturers probably paid big money for market research that told it fidget spinners — a fad that lasted about a year — were responsible for a significant category decline ten years in the making.

    “The gum category has been on a downward spiral for many years. Functional gum may help,” said RetroBrands President Jeff Kaplan, who is also seeking ownership of the discontinued Chiclets brand.

    Some recent attempts at multipurpose gum have sputtered. Wrigley, around since the 19th century and now owned by Mars, introduced Alert Energy Caffeine Gum in 2013. It was quickly pulled over concerns that its 40 milligrams of caffeine per stick would encourage too much caffeine for children.

    Mars brought it back in 2017 with clearer labeling of the high caffeine content. Sales were lackluster. Now Alert Caffeine Gum is no longer in mass distribution.

    The problem is that people chew gum for two primary reasons: fresh breath and enjoyment. Adding caffeine or a sleep agent does nothing to advance either. Instead, they’re just like the fidget spinner — gimmicks. The “innovations” don’t fundamentally add value for consumers. They’re incremental in nature. Like adding graphics to a garbage can liner. The more significant issue, and what CPG manufacturers should focus on, is what to do about legacy brands in legacy categories who see their value decline. From 2014–2017, the ten largest CPG companies lost over $13 billion in revenue to start-ups who meet changing consumer tastes. Weight-loss gum isn’t going to change that.